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ABSTRACT
After the 9/11 attacks in particular, there has been a controversial discus-
sion in the academic and public arena on whether the United States’ close
relationship with Israel has made it a likelier target of transnational terror-
ism. Indeed, foreign terrorist organizations with various ideological proﬁles
have repeatedly justiﬁed attacks against U.S. interests as punishment for
the (purported) special relationship between the United States and Israel.
We analyze the eﬀect of various measures of U.S. support for Israel (e.g.
U.S. military assistance to Israel) on anti-American terrorism for the period
1970–2014. Using both time-series and panel approaches, we do not ﬁnd
that more U.S. support for Israel systematically translates into more anti-
American terrorism. Rather, other systemic (e.g. U.S. dominance in the
international system) and local conditions (e.g. local state failure) are
found to predict the patterns of anti-American terrorism. However, as
a qualiﬁcation to these general ﬁndings, we also provide some (prelimin-
ary) evidence that for terrorism originating from the Middle East and
Northern Africa a favorable U.S. policy stance towards Israel may indeed
contribute to more anti-American terrorism.
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Introduction
A popular claim about transnational terrorism1 directed against the United States, especially with
respect to the 9/11 attacks, is that it is rooted in U.S. support for the state of Israel. For instance,
a representative survey among U.S. citizens in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks found that
85 percent of respondents believed U.S. support for Israel was at least a somewhat important
cause of the attacks, while all other factors (e.g. Islam, lack of economic aid) were considered less
inﬂuential (Davis and Silver 2004).
Indeed, U.S. support for Israel is cited as a motivating factor of Al Qaeda’s anti-American terrorist
activities. For instance, in his ‘Letter to America’ Bin Laden (2002) writes that
“[the] creation and continuation of Israel is one of the greatest crimes, and you [i.e. the Americans] are the
leaders of its criminals. And of course there is no need to explain and prove the degree of American support
for Israel. The creation of Israel is a crime which must be erased. Each and every person whose hands have
become polluted in the contribution towards this crime must pay its price, and pay for it heavily.”
Likewise, in its report the 9/11 Commission (2004) argues that for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, ‘the
principal architect of the 9/11 attacks’ (9/11 Commission 2004, 145), U.S. support for Israel was
crucial in motivating his turn to anti-American terrorism:
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“By his own account, KSM’s [Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s] animus toward the United States stemmed [. . .] from
his violent disagreement with U.S. foreign policy favoring Israel.” (9/11 Commission 2004, 147)
Consequently, some scholars emphasize a nexus between U.S. support for Israel and anti-American
terrorism, arguing that anti-American terrorism is a direct consequence of this very support.
A prominent example of this strand of the academic literature can be found in an essay by
Mearsheimer and Walt (2006, 30–31, 33)2 who argue that
“[. . .] Washington has provided Israel with a level of support dwarﬁng the amounts provided to any other state.
[. . .] [The] United States has a terrorism problem in good part because it is so closely allied with Israel [. . .] [U]
nconditional U.S. support for Israel makes it easier for extremists like Bin Laden to rally popular support and to
attract recruits.”
Motivated by these arguments, we study empirically whether there is a systematic relationship
between anti-American terrorism and U.S. support for Israel. In so doing, we add to the existing
literature in two ways. First, existing research suggests – as we discuss below in more detail – that
external support (e.g. in the form of military aid) for a local government that is already in conﬂict
with terrorist groups results in terrorist activity being consequently also directed against the
external sponsor.3 We apply this general theory to an important singular case, focusing on anti-
American terrorism (as an important sub-set of transnational terrorism) potentially resulting from
U.S. support for the state of Israel (a contentious special case in international relations). Second,
our empirical analysis also focuses on the systemic and spatial dimensions – hitherto disregarded
in empirical analysis on the role of U.S. aid in anti-American terrorism – inherent to the nexus
between U.S. support for Israel and anti-American terrorism by employing (i) a time-series
approach where the spatial unit of analysis is the world-system and (ii) a panel approach
(where the spatial unit of the analysis is the country) that can also account for spatial hetero-
geneity (e.g. due to diﬀerence in geographical or cultural proximity to Israel) associated with
country-speciﬁc responses to U.S. support for Israel. In so doing, our theoretical discussion and
empirical approach is reﬂective of the internationalization of the Arab-Israeli conﬂict and its
ramiﬁcations for anti-American terrorism.4
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the potential
theoretical linkages between U.S. support for Israel and the origins of anti-American terrorism
in more detail. In Section 3 we introduce our main indicators of anti-American terrorism and
U.S. support for Israel. Section 4 analyzes the nexus between these variables in a time-series
framework, while Section 5 examines the same nexus within a panel (time-series cross-sectional)
setting. Section 6 concludes.
U.S. Support for Israel and Anti-American Terrorism
The Strategic Logic Channel
Many terrorist organizations are hostile towards Israel. These organizations want to extract
concessions from Israel, reaching from the negotiable to the maximalist (‘destruction of Israel’).
As stressed by Plümper and Neumayer (2010), in order to reach their long-run goals (in our
case, extracting concessions from Israel), terrorist organizations have to reach an important
intermediate goal: gaining power relative to the enemy they oppose (in our case, the Israeli
government). This in turn creates a ‘strategic logic of attacking foreign allies’ of this very enemy
(Plümper and Neumayer 2010, 76), in our case attacking the United States as Israel’s most
important ally. U.S. support for Israel makes concessions less likely as it strengthens Israel’s
hand, e.g. by providing it with military aid and diplomatic backing. Terrorist attacks against the
United States are carried out to create political pressure from American voters and in U.S.
Congress to rethink the American relationship with Israel.5 Consequently, changes in
U.S. support for Israel following from anti-American terrorism are anticipated to shift the
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balance of power between the attacking terrorist organization and Israel in favor of the terrorist
group, also making terrorist success (the long-run terrorist goal) more likely.
Indeed, there is some evidence for the strategic logic channel. Plümper and Neumayer (2010)
ﬁnd that military alliances (say, between the U.S. and Israel) expose nationals to an increased risk of
terrorism originating in their ally’s home country, where this eﬀect becomes more pronounced as
the power asymmetry between allies increases. Similarly, Neumayer and Plümper (2011), Gries,
Redlin, and Meierrieks (2015) and Krieger and Meierrieks (2015) ﬁnd that countries that receive
more military support (e.g. in the form of arms exports) from the United States are more likely to
generate anti-American terrorism.
Considering the nexus between U.S. support for Israel and anti-American terrorism, the strategic
logic channel is likely to apply to two kinds of terrorist groups. First, to Arab-Palestinian groups that
directly oppose Israel. As LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (2009) ﬁnd, a number of these groups (e.g. the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) have indeed repeatedly also attacked U.S. targets. Second,
radical Islamist groups are generally sympathetic to the Palestinian cause as well as interested in
liberating one of Islam’s most holy sites (the Al-Aqsa Mosque) and in destroying the ‘world jewry’ as
an enemy of Islam.6 Again, such groups (e.g. Hezbollah, al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya) have also attacked
U.S. interests (LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw 2009).
The Support Channel
Besides terrorist organizations’ goal of weakening their enemy, Plümper and Neumayer (2010, 77)
name another important intermediate goal of these organizations: survival. To ensure survival,
terrorist groups depend on support. This support may come in the form of manpower, funding,
training, provision of matériel and sanctuary as well as intelligence (Paul 2010). Support for terrorist
groups can come from various sources: sympathetic local communities and diasporas (popular
support), states (state sponsorship of terrorism) and other terrorist groups. More support for
terrorist groups from external sources is expected to facilitate terrorism. For instance, with external
support it ought to become easier to evade capture (e.g. thanks to access to ‘safe havens’),
lowering the costs of carrying out terrorism.
Importantly, carrying out anti-American terrorism in the name of (perceived) U.S. support for
Israel may allow terrorist organizations to tap into various sources of support. First, the U.S. tends to
be an unpopular out-group in the Middle East, especially given its foreign policy behavior (Haddad
and Khasan 2002; Tessler and Robbins 2007). While attacking an out-group always ought to be
more popular than attacking fellow citizens, punishing the U.S. for its foreign policy failures may be
a beneﬁcial strategy to attract popular support especially for Arab-Palestinian groups as well as
radical Islamist groups.
Second, anti-American terrorism may make terrorist groups – of all ideological stripes – attractive
allies for states that are hostile towards Israel for strategic or ideological reasons. These countries have
an incentive to weaken Israel; they may achieve this by sponsoring anti-American terrorist groups so as
to coerce the U.S. into reducing its support to Israel or, more generally, take a more isolationist foreign
policy position that would consequently also allow for revisionist policies directed against Israel.
Indeed, countries that have been hostile to Israel in the past have also supported terrorist groups
that have attacked U.S. interests. Examples include the Philippine Moro National Liberation Front and
Peruvian Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (sponsored by Libya), Hezbollah (sponsored by Syria
and Iran) and the Abu Nidal Organization (sponsored by Syria and Iraq).7
Finally, terrorist organizations may gain support by allying themselves with other terrorist
organizations. For example, through cooperation groups may share expertise, equipment and
intelligence, thus aiding the terrorist groups’ survival. Especially during the Cold War, Latin
American and Western left-wing terrorist groups cooperated with Arab-Palestinian organizations
(Shughart 2006). For instance, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine at times cooperated
with the Colombian Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and the German Red Army
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Faction. For Arab-Palestinian groups – in line with the strategic logic channel outlined above –
such cooperation ought to have been beneﬁcial as left-wing terrorist groups would regularly
attack the United States (the common enemy of Arab-Palestinian and left-wing terrorism), thus
diverting U.S. resources away from the Middle East and possibly also contributing to a more
reluctant U.S. foreign policy stance. We can thus expect that increased U.S. support for Israel
would have created additional incentives for cooperation between terrorist groups. In fact, the
cooperation between Arab-Palestinian and left-wing terrorist groups was at times so close that
the (less powerful) left-wing terrorist groups would not only target U.S. interests but also
consciously adopt their ally’s ideology and/or target its main enemy (i.e. Israeli citizens). For
instance, the Japanese Red Army, originally a left-wing group, was closely allied with the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine as of the early 1970s and, in the following, adopted the latter’s
anti-Israel agenda. Subsequently, in the 1972 attack on Tel Aviv’s Lod Airport, members of the
Japanese Red Army killed or injured over 100 individuals on behalf of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (Shughart 2006, 23).
Hypothesis
In sum, the link from the U.S. support for Israel to anti-American terrorism may run via the strategic
logic and/or the support channel. In the following sections we empirically test whether such
linkages indeed exist, expecting support for the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis: More U.S. support for Israel is associated with more anti-American terrorism.
Main Data
We study the empirical relationship between anti-American terrorism and U.S. support for Israel in
a time-series (Section 4) and a panel setting (Section 5). For both types of analysis we use the same
measures of anti-American terrorism and U.S. support for Israel, which we describe below.
Anti-American Terrorism
Anti-American terrorism is measured by the number of terrorist attacks by citizens of another country
against U.S. interests. Transnational anti-American terrorist attacks may be directed at diplomatic
(e.g. embassies), military, commercial or non-oﬃcial (e.g. tourists) targets. For instance, we consider
transnational terrorism such as the 1988 bombing of a U.S. military recreational club in Naples
(Italy) by the Japanese Red Army (where the attack is assigned to Japan). Terrorist attacks carried
out by U.S. citizens within the U.S. that only victimize other U.S. citizens are, by contrast, not
considered; a prominent example of this kind of domestic terrorism is the 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing.
The data come from the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) dataset
(Mickolus et al. 2016). This dataset deﬁnes (transnational) terrorism as the use (or threat of use)
of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political purposes by any individual or group,
whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such action is
intended to inﬂuence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate
victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the
nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, its ramiﬁcations
transcend national boundaries (Mickolus et al. 2016). ITERATE excludes terrorist attacks against
combatants (e.g. on U.S. troops that act as an occupying force in Iraq); however, it includes
attacks against U.S. military forces that act as peacekeepers (e.g. during the 1983–1984
Lebanon intervention).
4 D. MEIERRIEKS AND T. GRIES
Figure 1 displays the patterns of anti-American terrorism for the 1970–2014 period. As also
discussed in LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (2009), there was more anti-American terrorist activity
during the Cold War era (1970–1990) when the United States were prominently attacked by left-
wing terrorist groups hailing from Latin America (e.g. the Peruvian Shining Path) and Western
Europe (e.g. the Italian Red Brigades). Many of these groups lost popular and external support after
the end of the Cold War, explaining the relative decline in anti-American terrorism after 1990.
Instead, after 1990 anti-American transnational terrorism was more strongly associated with
Islamist violence (e.g. by Al-Qaeda).
Measuring U.S. Support for Israel
For our analysis we consider two dimensions of U.S. support for Israel, military support in the form
of military aid and diplomatic patronage at the United Nations.
Military support for Israel is measured by U.S. military foreign assistance provided to Israel (in constant
dollars) as a share of total (global) U.S. military aid in a speciﬁc year. For instance, U.S. military assistance
includes grants and loans given by the U.S. via the Foreign Military Financing Program that is used to
help countries purchase defense equipment produced in the United States as well as acquiring defense
services and military training. The data on military aid come from the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) (USAID 2015).8
As shown in Figure 2, on average the U.S. provided approximately US$ 3 billion in military aid to
Israel, where military aid was in general relatively steady but with noticeable peaks in the 1970s. As
a share of total military aid, U.S. assistance to Israel was more volatile, ranging from two percent in
the early 1970s to 60 percent in the late 1970s to approximately 25 percent in 2014.
To indicate diplomatic patronage of Israel by the United States we consider the similarities in
voting between the U.S. and Israel at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in a given year.
UNGA voting data are drawn from an update of Voeten, Strezhnev, and Bailey (2009). The UNGA
voting variable can lie between 0 for complete disagreement between both countries and +1 for
complete agreement. Figure 3 compares the diplomatic alignment between the United States and
Figure 1. Global anti-American terrorism, 1970–2014.
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Israel with the alignment between Israel and the rest of the world on average. Clearly, the
alignment between the U.S. and Israel has been markedly stronger than the alignment between
the rest of the world and Israel at least since the 1980s, which is indicative of a special diplomatic
relationship between Israel and the United States. Consequently, our measure of diplomatic
patronage is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the diplomatic alignment between the United
Figure 2. U.S. military support for Israel, 1970–2014.
Figure 3. Diplomatic position of Israel at the United Nations, 1970–2014.
6 D. MEIERRIEKS AND T. GRIES
States and Israel and between Israel and the rest of the world on average. We interpret higher
values of this variable to coincide with stronger diplomatic patronage by the United States.9
Time-Series Approach
The determinants of anti-American terrorism may be analyzed at either the country-level or the level
of the international system. In this section we employ a system-level time-series approach. Earlier
examples that use such an approach to uncover the structural determinants of (anti-American)
terrorism are O’Brien (1996), Volgy, Imwalle, and Corntassel (1997), Sobek and Braithwaite (2005),
Lizardo (2006) and Krieger and Meierrieks (2015). Indeed, taking on a system-level perspective may
be appropriate in the context of the nexus between U.S. support for Israel and the patterns of anti-
American terrorism. U.S. support for Israel takes place within the international system; it is an
observable policy variable that can be considered to be independent from country-level conditions
in the country of origin of a potential anti-American terrorist. In other words, anti-American attacks
motivated by U.S. support for Israel can occur anywhere in the world and be carried out by terrorist
actors hailing from any country.10 Consequently, for a test of our main hypothesis we compile time-
series (system-level) data for anti-American terrorism, U.S. support and additional controls for the
1970–2014 period. The summary statistics of these variables are presented in Table 1.
Empirical Model and Controls
Our time-series estimation equation looks as follows:
terrort ¼ /0 þ β1  supportq;t1 þ β0  X 0t1 þ εt (1)
Here, terror refers to the global number of anti-American terrorist incidents in a given year t, while
support refers to the q-th indicator of U.S. support for Israel (share of U.S. military aid to Israel or
diplomatic patronage at the UNGA). Besides a well-behaved error term (ε), the model also includes
Table 1. Summary statistics.
Variable N*T Mean Std. Deviation Min. Max.
Time-Series Data
Anti-American Terrorism 44 85.39 52.54 15 225
U.S. Military Aid to Israel (%) 44 32.41 14.47 1.05 58.89
U.S. Diplomatic Patronage of Israel 44 0.37 0.19 -0.08 0.69
U.S. Dominance 44 -13.38 3.35 -19.26 -3.74
Power Balance 44 1.07 0.61 0.64 3.75
Cold War 44 0.5 0.51 0 1
U.S. Involvement in International Crises 44 0.77 0.83 0 3
Republican President 44 0.61 0.49 0 1
U.S. Military Aid to Israel (logged) 44 21.75 0.60 18.81 23.12
U.S. UNGA Voting with Israel 44 0.01 0.07 -0.13 0.19
Panel Data
Anti-American Terrorism 6,201 0.31 1.78 0 90
U.S. Military Aid to Israel (%) 6,201 32.41 14.47 1.05 58.89
U.S. Diplomatic Patronage of Israel 6,201 0.37 0.19 -0.08 0.69
Per Capita Income (logged) 6,201 8.58 1.22 4.89 12.43
Population Size (logged) 6,201 4.46 1.58 0.18 9.52
Per Capita U.S. Military Aid 6,201 0.25 1.49 0 45.20
Democracy 6,148 1.29 7.40 -10 10
State Failure 6,201 0.56 1.55 0 13.5
Cold War 6,201 0.44 0.50 0 1
Distance to the U.S. 6,201 8.96 3.39 0.74 16.37
Trade Openness 6,201 0.47 0.45 0.01 6.09
Muslim Population Share 6,201 0.26 0.36 0 0.99
U.S. Military Aid to Israel (logged) 6,201 21.75 0.60 18.81 23.12
U.S. UNGA Voting with Israel 6,201 0.01 0.07 -0.13 0.19
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a vector of controls (X) discussed below. All independent variables are lagged by one year to
reduce simultaneity concerns.
Given the count-data nature of the dependent variable, which only assumes discrete, non-
negative values, we estimate Equation (1) using a generalized linear model for count data, where
the count is expected to come from a negative binomial distribution that accounts for the
overdispersion of the dependent variable (Cameron and Trivedi 2013). As time-series data is
likely aﬀected by serial correlation, we report Newey-West standard errors (Newey and West
1987). Finally, the use of time series data raises the issue of non-stationarity; using non-stationary
data may give rise to spurious regression problems (Enders 2010). Applying the unit root test by
Phillips and Perron (1988), we ﬁnd that all variables except our measures of diplomatic patronage
are stationary (Supplementary Table 1), so that issue such as spuriousness and cointegration do
not arise. The diplomatic patronage variables are ﬁrst-diﬀerenced to achieve stationarity.11
With respect to the control variables (X), we only include a small number of controls to retain
suﬃcient degrees of freedom, given that our number of observations is rather small (T= 44). First, we
control forU.S. dominance in the international political system. Sobek and Braithwaite (2005) argue that
when the U.S. is dominant, terrorism becomes themost cost-eﬃcient means to change the status quo
(e.g. via a regime or territorial change) that is upheld by the United States (Sobek and Braithwaite
2005). As in Sobek and Braithwaite (2005, 143–144), to operationalize U.S. dominance we identify the
chief revisionist rival of the U.S. in a given year. The chief revisionist rival is the countrywith the highest
CINC score (Composite Index of National Capabilities score) and the lowest agreement with the U.S. in
terms of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in a given year.12 The CINC score aggregates six
individual components of national material capabilities (iron and steel production, energy consump-
tion, total population, urban population, military personnel and military expenditures) into a single
value per state-year to reﬂect a country’s power, using updated data from Singer (1987). As in Sobek
and Braithwaite (2005), the product of the UNGA voting variable drawn from Voeten, Strezhnev, and
Bailey (2009) and the CINC score is our measure of U.S. dominance.
Second, we include a variable that measures American power relative to the power of its main
rival (power balance). It is operationalized as the ratio of the U.S. CINC score to the chief rival’s CINC
score. A larger value of this variable corresponds to the U.S. being more powerful compared to its
main rival. We remain agnostic about the eﬀect of changes in the power balance variable on anti-
American terrorism. For one, it is possible that increases in U.S. power deter terrorism as terrorist
organizations may shy away from attacking a powerful enemy for fear of retaliation (Sobek and
Braithwaite 2005, 141). For another, it may also be possible that American rivals are more likely to
use terrorism (as a foreign policy tool) to undermine the advantage of a more powerful U.S.,
implying a positive relationship between U.S. power and anti-American terrorism (Volgy, Imwalle,
and Corntassel 1997).
Third, during the Cold War the U.S. was repeatedly targeted by left-wing terrorist groups which
were used by non-Western countries (e.g. Libya, Cuba) as proxies to challenge the U.S. (O’Brien
1996; Sobek and Braithwaite 2005). The end of the Cold War curtailed this support while under-
mining the ideological foundations of many left-wing terrorist groups (Shughart 2006), possibly
contributing to a decline in anti-American terrorism after the end of the Cold War. We thus expect
the Cold War era to positively predict anti-American terrorism. The Cold War era is indicated by
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the 1970–1990 period and 0 afterwards.
As a robustness check, we amend our baseline model with two additional controls. For one, we
control for incidences of Republican U.S. presidencies (indicated by a dummy variable that is equal
to 1 when a Republican is president and 0 otherwise). Koch and Cranmer (2007) ﬁnd that
governments of the left (for the U.S., Democratic governments) are more likely to be targeted by
terrorism than governments of the right (Republican governments). They argue that the more
hawkish policies of right-wing governments deter terrorist activity. However, the same hawkish
policies may also incite anti-American resentment. We thus remain agnostic about the eﬀect of this
variable on anti-American terrorism. For another, we control for the number of international crises
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the U.S. is involved in for a speciﬁc year, using data from the International Crisis Behavior Dataset
updated from Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000). We expect a greater involvement in crises to predict
anti-American terrorism, e.g. as anti-American terrorism is used by crisis actors hostile to the United
States.
Empirical Results
The time-series regression estimates are reported in Table 2. Considering our main variables of
interest, there is no systematic evidence in favor of our main hypothesis; as reported in the appendix
(Supplementary Table 2), this is also the case when both support variables enter the model at the
same time. In other words, we ﬁnd no evidence that more military-ﬁnancial or diplomatic support
by the United States for Israel – regardless of how this support is operationalized – translates into
more anti-American terrorism at the system-level. This interpretation does not only follow from
a lack of statistical signiﬁcance associated with the estimates for military-ﬁnancial or diplomatic
support but also the lack of economic substantiveness. For instance, we can transform the
regression coeﬃcient associated with military assistance in model (1) of Table 2 into an incidence-
rate ratio (IRR) of IRR = 0.998, implying that a one-percent increase in U.S. military aid to Israel
results in a reduction in the global count of anti-American terrorist attacks by only 0.2 percent.
Considering the controls, the ﬁndings reported in Table 2 suggest that anti-American terrorism is
associated with factors other than U.S. support for Israel. First, consistent with Sobek and Braithwaite
(2005), higher levels of U.S. dominance lead to more anti-American terrorism. This may indicate that
terrorism becomes a likelier means of challenging the status quo when U.S. dominance obstructs
more conventional ways to change it (Sobek and Braithwaite 2005). Second, higher levels of
U.S. power (relative to its main rival) are negatively related to anti-American terrorism. This ﬁnding
may be indicative of a deterrence eﬀect.13 Third, anti-American terrorism was less likely after the end
of the Cold War. A lack of material support from non-Western countries and the reduced ideological
standing of left-wing terrorist groups after 1990 possibly accounts for this ﬁnding, as also argued by
Shughart (2006). Fourth, we ﬁnd that Republican presidencies are associated with more anti-
American terrorism, potentially as these presidencies tended to coincide with more aggressive
foreign policy behavior. Finally, being involved in international crises was also conducive to anti-
American terrorism. For instance, protests against U.S. crisis behavior may have also taken on the
Table 2. Time-series evidence.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
U.S. Military Aid to -0.002 0.005
Israel (%) t-1 (0.005) (0.004)
Δ U.S. Diplomatic 0.465 0.503
Patronage of Israel t-1 (0.369) (0.318)
U.S. Dominance t-1 0.112 0.107 0.084 0.103
(0.036)*** (0.044)** (0.024)*** (0.030)***
Power Balance t-1 -0.703 -0.667 -0.661 -0.771
(0.151)*** (0.202)*** (0.117)*** (0.123)***
Cold War t-1 0.781 0.789 0.695 0.674
(0.142)*** (0.155)*** (0.119)*** (0.130)**
U.S. Involvement in 0.292 0.272
International Crises t-1 (0.079)*** (0.079)***
Republican President t-1 0.341 0.311
(0.107)*** (0.123)**
No. of Observations 44 44 44 44
Model Deviance 8.40 8.34 5.37 5.45
Mean VIF 2.94 2.41 2.61 2.18
Notes: Negative binomial generalized linear regression results reported. Dependent variable = Count of transna-
tional terrorist attack primarily directed against U.S. target. VIF = Variance inﬂation factor. Constant not reported.
Newey-West standard errors standard errors in parentheses *p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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form of anti-American terrorism (e.g. terrorist attacks against American interests in Western Europe
during the Vietnam War).
Panel Analysis
The time-series analysis of Section 4 provides no evidence in favor of our main hypothesis. At the
system-level, more U.S. support for Israel does not result in more anti-American terrorism. However,
the system-level perspective has been criticized for not accounting for the role of country-speciﬁc
conditions in explaining anti-American terrorism. For instance, Neumayer and Plümper (2011, 8)
favor a country-speciﬁc (time-series cross-sectional) over a system-level (time-series) approach,
arguing that only the former perspective sheds
“[. . .] light on the causes of anti-American terrorism. This is because while such terrorism is widespread across
the world, there are also clear and stark diﬀerences in its extent across terrorists’ countries of origin.”
Indeed, for our panel of 150 countries for the period 1970 to 2014,14 51 countries produced no
anti-American terrorism and 49 countries produced less than ﬁve anti-American terrorist attacks
during the observation period. Thus, it may be meaningful to also consider the nexus between
U.S. support for Israel and anti-American terrorism in a framework that explicitly accounts for
country-speciﬁc factors.
Empirical Model and Controls
Our time-series cross-sectional estimation equation looks as follows:
terrorit ¼ /0 þ β1  supportq;t1 þ β0  X 0it1 þ εt (2)
Here, terror refers to the number of anti-American terrorist incidents produced in country i in year t,
while support – as in Equation (1) – refers to the q-th indicator of U.S. support for Israel. These
indicators are the same for all countries in the sample for a speciﬁc year, accounting for the fact
that U.S. support for Israel is an observable policy variable that is independent from country-level
conditions in the country of origin of a potential anti-American terrorist. Model (2) also includes
a well-behaved error term (ε) and a vector of controls (X) discussed below. All explanatory variables
are lagged by one year to reduce endogeneity concerns.
We estimate model (2) running a series of negative binomial regressions (Cameron and
Trivedi 2013). As above, this method is appropriate because our dependent variable is a count
variable (the number of anti-American terrorist incidents per country-year) that only assumes
discrete, non-negative values. Given the presence of overdispersion (i.e. the variance of the
dependent variable is larger than its mean), a negative binomial model is preferred over
a Poisson model (Cameron and Trivedi 2013).
Considering the vector of controls (X), we follow the literature on the determinants of terrorism
(for a review, see Krieger and Meierrieks 2011) as well as on the determinants of anti-American
terrorism in particular (e.g. Neumayer and Plümper 2011; Gries, Redlin, and Meierrieks 2015; Krieger
and Meierrieks 2015). First, we control for the eﬀect of economic development which is measured by
(logged) real per capita income. The data come from the Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar, and
Timmer 2015). Richer countries may be less likely to produce anti-American terrorism due to the
high opportunity costs of participating in terrorism (Krieger and Meierrieks 2011). We thus expect
a negative correlation between a country’s level of economic development and the level of anti-
American terrorism .
Second, we control for (logged) population size. The data are again drawn from the Penn World
Table. Countries with larger populations are expected to produce more anti-American terrorism
because they exhibit a larger pool of (potential) terrorists, terrorist supporters, and (U.S.) victims.
Higher policing costs in larger countries may also favor the emergence of terrorism. Indeed, the
10 D. MEIERRIEKS AND T. GRIES
empirical consensus on the determinants of terrorism is that population size ought to correlate
positively with terrorism (Krieger and Meierrieks 2011).
Third, we consider the role of military aid by the United States as a potential determinant of anti-
American terrorism. It is measured by the amount of U.S. military aid (in constant U.S. dollars)
provided to a speciﬁc country divided by local population size to account for scale eﬀects; the data
on military aid are drawn from USAID (2015). As already argued above, in discussing the strategic
logic channel, Neumayer and Plümper (2011) ﬁnd that countries receiving more military aid are
also more likely to produce anti-American terrorism. Generalizing the ideas underlying the strategic
logic channel (i.e. abstracting from the case of Israel), we can expect military aid by the United
States to strengthen any local government opposed by any local terrorist group, which creates
a strategic incentive for the local terrorist group to attack the U.S. so as to weaken U.S. support for
the local government (Neumayer and Plümper 2011). We thus expect military aid by the United
States to be positively related to anti-American terrorism.
Fourth, a country’s regime type may also matter. This variable is measured by the Polity2
score from the Polity IV Dataset of Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers (2015), which ranges from −10
(strongly autocratic regime) to +10 (strongly democratic regime). For one, more democratic
countries may see less (anti-American) terrorism because democracies oﬀer (cost-eﬃcient) non-
violent means to achieve political change, making terrorism a less attractive option (e.g. Krieger
and Meierrieks 2011). For another, democracies are also less likely to counter terrorism eﬀec-
tively due to constraints on the executive (e.g. respect for civil liberties), which may make
democracies likelier breeding grounds of terrorism (e.g. Krieger and Meierrieks 2011). Thus, we
remain agnostic about the expected eﬀect of democracy on anti-American terrorism.
Fifth, we control for state failure, indicated by a composite state failure index capturing the
intensity of revolutionary and ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, genocides and politicides
published by the Political Instability Failure Task Force (PITF Global Report 2015). We expect
state failure to positively predict anti-American terrorism. For instance, failing states exhibit
only weak law enforcement and military capabilities, making it easier for terrorist groups to
operate (Piazza 2008).
Sixth, we again include a control for the Cold War era (indicated by a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 for the 1968–1990 period and 0 thereafter). As with the time-series analysis of Section 4,
we expect the Cold War era to positively predict anti-American terrorism.
Finally, as robustness checks we amend our baseline model with two additional controls
accounting for geographical distance to the United States15 and the level of trade openness
(Penn World Table data). We expect the former variable to negatively predict anti-American
terrorism (as distance ought to increase the costs of carrying out this type of terrorism) and the
latter to positively predict it (e.g. as higher levels of openness coincide with stronger anti-
globalization resentment that results in anti-American terrorism; for a further discussion see
Krieger and Meierrieks 2015).
Main Results
Our panel analysis results are reported in Table 3. Considering our main variables of interest, we
ﬁnd – consistent with the time-series evidence presented above – no systematic evidence that more
U.S. support for Israel leads to more anti-American terrorism. This ﬁnding holds regardless of how
U.S. support for Israel is operationalized; as shown in the appendix (Supplementary Table 3), it
furthermore holds when both support variables enter the model at the same time. That is, there is
again no support for our main hypothesis.
The results for the control variables are remarkably similar across the various model speciﬁcations.
These results provide insights into which economic, demographic and political variables – rather than
U.S. support for Israel – are indeed relevant to explaining anti-American terrorism. First, we do not ﬁnd
that richer countries are more likely to produce anti-American terrorism. This is consistent with the
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empirical mainstream that economic underdevelopment tends to be a weak predictor of terrorism
(Krieger and Meierrieks 2011). Second, more populous countries produce more anti-American terrorism.
This ﬁnding is also consistent with the empirical mainstream on the determinants of terrorism (Krieger
andMeierrieks 2011) in that more populous countries have larger pools of potential terrorists and victims
so that they ought to seemore anti-American terrorism due to scale eﬀects. Third, as previously found by
Neumayer and Plümper (2011) and Gries, Redlin, and Meierrieks (2015), more military aid by the United
States leads to more anti-American terrorism originating in aid-receiving countries.16 Potentially, this is
because local terrorist groups use anti-American terrorism to curtail U.S. support for local governments
(Neumayer and Plümper 2011). Importantly, this result suggests that the strategic logic channel matters
at the (local) country-level rather than the system-level. Fourth, regime type does not matter to anti-
American terrorism,meaning that neither autocratic nor democratic countries aremore likely to generate
anti-American terrorism. Fifth, anti-American terrorism ismore likely to originate from failing states, which
is consistent with Piazza (2008) who argues that these types of states oﬀer terrorist groups favorable
conditions (e.g. weak and corrupt law enforcement) under which to operate. Sixth, as expected, anti-
American terrorism was more likely during the Cold War (e.g. due to support for it by non-Western
countries). Finally, while a country’s level of trade openness does not predict anti-American terrorism,
terrorism against the United States is less likely to originate from countries that are further away from the
U.S. in terms of geographical distance, potentially because distance increases the costs of carrying out
attacks and reduces the availability of American targets.
Further Panel Analyses
Our various measures of U.S. support for Israel are not country-speciﬁc but – as variables measured
at the system-level – identical across countries. Still, we can argue that these support variables
should not uniformly aﬀect anti-American terrorism for all countries in our sample. For instance, in
countries such as Egypt (due to its proximity to Israel) U.S. support for Israel may be a much
Table 3. Panel analysis results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
U.S. Military Aid to 0.011 0.010
Israel (%) t-1 (0.008) (0.007)
Δ U.S. Diplomatic 0.165 0.176
Patronage of Israel t-1 (0.377) (0.392)
Per Capita Income t-1 0.195 0.183 0.228 0.215
(0.124) (0.124) (0.139)* (0.140)
Population Size t-1 0.642 0.635 0.668 0.664
(0.093)*** (0.094)*** (0.104)*** (0.104)***
Per Capita 0.315 0.306 0.305 0.299
U.S. Military Aid t-1 (0.087)*** (0.086)*** (0.080)*** (0.080)***
Democracy t-1 0.012 0.013 -0.006 -0.004
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
State Failure t-1 0.330 0.344 0.322 0.333
(0.080)*** (0.085)*** (0.068)*** (0.070)***
Cold War t-1 1.233 1.205 1.092 1.070
(0.221)*** (0.085)*** (0.226)*** (0.232)***
Distance to the U.S. -0.129 -0.130
(0.040)*** (0.041)***
Trade Openness t-1 -0.436 -0.423
(0.400) (0.403)
No. of Observations 5,999 5,999 5,999 5,999
Wald χ2 166.97 138.32 157.29 137.75
Prob.> χ2) (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.089 0.102 0.101
Notes: Negative binomial regression results reported. Constant not reported. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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stronger catalyst of anti-American terrorism than in, e.g. Colombia. In other words, there may be
spatial (or country-speciﬁc) heterogeneity associated with terrorist responses to U.S. support for
Israel. In the following, we consider two factors that may explain why U.S. support for Israel incites
anti-American terrorism more strongly in speciﬁc countries.
1. We argue that being from a MENA country (i.e. from a country located in the Middle East or
Northern Africa) may make terrorists particularly responsive to (changes in) U.S. support for
Israel. For one, these countries are geographically close to Israel. For instance, this means that
many Arab-Palestinian operate and recruit in these countries (e.g. the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine – General Command in Syria or the Palestinian Liberation Organization
in Lebanon and Tunisia). For another, many MENA countries are stakeholders in the Arab-
Israeli conﬂict which is characterized by ethnic-ideological tensions (Zionism vs. Arab nation-
alism) and international warfare (e.g. the Six-Day War of 1967). Citizens of MENA countries
may consequently more strongly resort to anti-American terrorism due to the (perceived)
one-sidedness of the United States in the Arab-Israeli conﬂict.
2. As already argued in this paper, there is a distinct religious dimension to the Israeli-
Palestinian/Arab conﬂict in the form of a conﬂict between Judaism (supported by the
U.S. as a predominantly Christian country) and Islam. On the part of Israel’s enemies, this
conﬂict can consequently be framed as a ‘holy war’ to dispel ‘inﬁdels’ from Islamic holy sites
and to stop the ‘oppression’ of Muslim by non-Muslims. Thus, the responsiveness to
U.S. support for Israel may increase with a country’s Muslim population share.
To estimate whether these two factors (location in the MENA region or the Muslim population
share) matter, we estimate two variants of model (2) that are speciﬁed as follows:
terrorit ¼ /0 þ β11  supportq;t1 þ β
0  X 0 it1 þ εt if MENA ¼ 1
/0 þ β21  supportq;t1 þ β0  X 0 it1 þ εt if MENA ¼ 0

(3a)
terrorit ¼
/0 þ β31  supportq;t1 þ β0  X 0 it1 þ εt ifMuslim> 25%
/0 þ β41  supportq;t1 þ β0  X 0 it1 þ εt ifMuslim ¼ 25 50%
/0 þ β51  supportq;t1 þ β0  X 0 it1 þ εt ifMuslim> 50%
8<
: (3b)
In models (3a) and (3b) we are primarily interested in whether the regression coeﬃcients associated
with the various support variables suﬃciently change when we compare (i) whether a country of origin
of a terrorist committing anti-American terrorism is or is not located in the MENA region or (ii) the role
of a country’s Muslim population share.17 We formally examine this by running a series of tests of
coeﬃcient equality, i.e. tests with the null hypothesis that β11 = β21 for model (3a) and β31 = β41 = β51
for model (3b).
We report our empirical ﬁndings for models (3a) and (3b) in Table 4. In short, the results suggest
that the size of the Muslim population share does not matter. Countries with a larger Muslim
population share do not produce more anti-American terrorism given a speciﬁc level of
U.S. support for Israel. Rather, regardless of how large the Muslim population share is, there is
never a statistically signiﬁcant association between the support variables and the emergence of
anti-American terrorism.
However, there is a diﬀerence between MENA and non-MENA countries. More U.S. military
aid and U.S. diplomatic patronage of Israel result in more anti-American terrorism originating
from MENA countries but do not aﬀect anti-American terrorism originating from non-MENA
countries. To study the substantiveness of the associated eﬀects, we can furthermore calculate
the associated IRR. For instance, for model (1) of Table 4 the calculated IRR suggest that a ten-
percent increase in U.S. military aid leads to (ceteris paribus) a 32 percent increase in the
number of anti-American terrorist attacks originating in MENA countries; the same increase in
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aid, by contrast, only results in a 7 percent rise (that is not statistically signiﬁcant) in the number
of anti-American terrorist attacks from non-MENA countries. In sum, this latter ﬁnding may then
suggest that the geographical proximity to Israel as well as ethnic, religious and political
circumstances that are speciﬁc to the MENA region make citizens from MENA countries more
responsive to U.S. policies regarding Israel and consequently more likely to engage in anti-
American terrorism.
Conclusion
Over the last decades, terrorist organizations with various ideological proﬁles have repeatedly
justiﬁed attacks against U.S. interests as punishment for the (purported) special relationship
between the United States and Israel. What is more, the idea of a nexus between the United
States’ support for the state of Israel and its vulnerability to transnational terrorism has also been
controversially discussed in the scholarly and public arena, especially in the context of the 9/11
attacks. Motivated by these considerations, for the 1970–2014 period we study whether
U.S. support for Israel indeed induces anti-American terrorism at the level of the international
political system (using time-series data) and at the country-level (using time-series cross-sectional
data). We argue that the link from the U.S. support for Israel to anti-American terrorism may run via
the (i) strategic logic channel, where terrorist groups may resort to anti-American terrorism to make
U.S. support for Israel more costly, ultimately shifting the balance of power in the terrorists’ favor or
(ii) the support channel, where terrorist organizations may punish the United States for its
(perceived) one-sided support for Israel to garner support from anti-Semitic or anti-Imperialist
Table 4. Additional panel analysis results.
U.S. Military Aid to Israel (%) Δ U.S. Diplomatic Patronage of Israel
Support Variable → (1) (2) (3) (4)
Support Variable t-1 [MENA] 0.031 2.239
(0.100)*** (0.776)***
Support Variable t-1 [Rest of World] 0.007 -0.100
(0.008) (0.440)
Support Variable t-1 [Muslim > 25%] 0.010 0.296
(0.008) (0.454)
Support Variable t-1 [Muslim 25–50%] 0.007 0.407
(0.013) (2.176)
Support Variable t-1 [Muslim > 50%] 0.016 0.271
(0.010) (0.756)
Per Capita Income t-1 0.088 0.172 0.172 0.175
(0.119) (0.124) (0.123) (0.124)
Population Size t-1 0.643 0.624 0.627 0.626
(0.095)*** (0.095)*** (0.094)*** (0.094)***
Per Capita U.S. Military Aid t-1 0.278 0.303 0.303 0.301
(0.108)** (0.092)*** (0.085)*** (0.085)***
Democracy t-1 0.035 0.020 0.016 0.015
(0.015)** (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
State Failure t-1 0.312 0.337 0.349 0.347
(0.085)*** (0.082)*** (0.086)*** (0.087)***
Cold War t-1 1.303 1.254 1.193 1.186
(0.212)*** (0.211)*** (0.215)*** (0.215)***
No. of Observations 5,999 5,999 5,999 5,999
Wald χ2 182.75 187.47 137.30 144.19
(Prob.> χ2) (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.091 0.089 0.089
Equality of Coeﬃcients χ2-Test 9.79 0.89 6.53 0.00
(Prob. > χ2) (0.00)*** (0.64) (0.01)** (0.99)
Notes: Negative binomial regression results reported. Constant not reported. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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segments of society (popular support) as well as state and terrorist actors that are hostile to the
United States and Israel.
Our empirical results indicate that regardless of which level of analysis or which dimension
(military or diplomatic) of U.S. support for Israel we consider, more U.S. support does not lead to
more anti-American terrorism. Instead, a variety of other economic, political and demographic
factors are found to sway anti-American terrorism at both levels of analysis. For instance, while
U.S. military aid to the Israeli government does not aﬀect anti-American terrorism, U.S. military aid
to local governments fuels it, suggesting that circumstances in the terrorists’ country of origin
inﬂuence their calculus more strongly than (potentially more abstract) international conditions.
Our empirical study was aimed at identifying a systematic eﬀect of U.S. military support for and
diplomatic patronage of Israel on anti-American terrorism. We were not able to detect such an
eﬀect. As an important qualiﬁcation, however, we did ﬁnd some (preliminary) evidence that for the
MENA region a favorable U.S. policy stance towards Israel may have indeed contributed to anti-
American terrorism. For instance, this ﬁnding is relevant in the context of the 9/11 attacks, where
all perpetrators hailed from MENA countries. However, more research is necessary to understand
the underlying mechanisms that appear to be speciﬁc to the MENA region more clearly.
Notes
1. Transnational terrorism means that more than one country is aﬀected by a terrorist incident. For instance, the
9/11 attacks were transnational because foreign terrorists attacked on U.S. soil.
2. Given its delicate and somewhat polemic nature, the study by Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) has drawn a fair
share of criticism, e.g. by Lieberman (2009).
3. For instance, this three-way strategic interaction between a local government, its external sponsor and
a terrorist group hostile to both the local government and its sponsor is modelled by Addison and Murshed
(2005) and Neumayer and Plümper (2011).
4. For instance, this internationalization already becomes apparent in the fact that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is
a Pakistani citizen.
5. Pape (2003) provides an example where such a coercive strategy was successful. In 1983 Hezbollah began
a (suicide) terrorist campaign against a U.S.-led multinational peacekeeping mission during the Lebanese civil
war. The campaign ended with the withdrawal of U.S. forces due to the political pressure the campaign had
created in the United States (Pape 2003).
6. Anti-Semitism as a motive for anti-American terrorism is discussed in Sedgwick (2004). For an example of anti-
Semitic thinking associated with radical Islamist groups, take the following quote from Bin Laden’s (2002)
‘Letter to America’:‘[Y]ou [the U.S.] build your economy and investments on usury. As a result of this, in all its
diﬀerent forms and guises, the Jews have taken control of your economy, through which they have then taken
control of your media, and now control all aspects of your life making you their servants and achieving their
aims at your expense [. . .].’
7. Information on state sponsorship of terrorism is drawn from various issues of the Country Reports on Terrorism
published by the U.S. State Department.
8. As a robustness check, we also use the (logged) amount of U.S. military foreign assistance provided to Israel in
a given year as an alternative indicator of U.S. military support for Israel. As reported in the appendix
(Supplementary Tables 2 and 3), using this alternative indicator does not change the empirical ﬁndings
reported in the main text.
9. As another robustness check, we also use the level of diplomatic alignment between the United States and
Israel at the UNGA as an alternative measure of the special diplomatic relationship between Israel and the
United States. As reported in the appendix (Supplementary Tables 2 and 3), employing this alternative
indicator of diplomatic patronage does not aﬀect the ﬁndings reported in the main text.
10. Take Al Qaeda as an example, a group clearly motivated in part by American support for Israel. The group
attacked American targets in the 1990s and 2000s in various parts of the world (e.g. the 1998 attacks on the
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen). Its operatives hail from
numerous countries in the Middle East (e.g. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt) but also non-
Muslim majority countries (e.g. Canada, the United Kingdom, India and Kenya).
11. Using the diplomatic patronage variables in levels (i.e. without taking the ﬁrst-diﬀerence), however, does not
yield results that are diﬀerent from the ones reported below (results available upon request).
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12. According to this deﬁnition, the USSR was the main revisionist rival in 1970–1971, 1977–1981, 1983–1990 as
well as (now as Russia) in 2006 and 2008, while it was China in 1972–1976, 1982, 1991–2005, 2007 and
2009–2014.
13. Importantly, the multicollinearity statistics (mean VIF) indicate that multicollinearity does not drive these ﬁrst
two results. That is, the variables indicating dominance and power balance measure distinct concepts.
14. The summary statistics of the panel data are reported in Table 1. A country list is provided in the appendix.
15. Data on this variable is drawn from the CEPII GeoDist Dataset (available at http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd_
modele/presentation.asp?id=6).
16. As reported in the appendix (Supplementary Table 3), dropping the local military aid variable from our model
does not aﬀect the main ﬁndings of this paper concerning the eﬀect of U.S. aid to Israel on anti-American
terrorism.
17. Data on the Muslim population share are drawn from the CIA World Factbook (available at https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/).
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d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, D.R. of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea (South), Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania,
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Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden,
Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
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